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and Clark decisions should be seriously considered in the determination
of future conflicts arising in this area.
WILLIAM E. ZUCKERMAN.
Conflict of Laws-Workmen's Compensation-Application of Full
Faith and Credit to Statutes and Awards
Shortly after the introduction of the first workmen's compensation
statutes,1 the courts faced the problem of their application where an
employee had been hired in one state and was injured in a sister state.
Prior to 1932 each state decided whether the situation permitted the
application of her own act.2  The claimant, suing in the locus deicti,
usually succeeded ini i'nvong the application of its statute.3  In some
instances, however, certain restrictive statutory provisions prevented the
state of the injury from applying her act4 and the employee had to resort
to suit in the state where his contract had been made.5 In these cases
suit had to be brought in the state of the contract in order to obtain the
benefit of that state's act, as the state of the injury considered the cause
of action created by the foreign act to be so interwoven with the remedy
that it felt compelled not to enforce it.6 Occasionally, the requirements
'Wisconsin's workmen's compensation act was the first to take effect (1911).
SoMERs, WORtmEN'S COMPENSATION 32 (1954). The New York statute was the
first to be declared constitutional by the United States Supreme Court. N. Y. Cen-
tral Railroad Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188 (1917).
* LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 8620 (1954).
* Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Ind. Comm'n, 32 Ariz. 275, 257 Pac.
644 (1927); Farr v. Babcock Lumber & Land Co., 182 N. C. 725, 109 S. E. 833
(1921) ; Interstate Power Co. v. Ind. Comm'n, 203 Wis. 466, 234 N. W. 889 (1931).
However, where the statute of the place of the injury is of the contractual type, the
courts have refused to apply their acts to injuries within the state, if the hiring
had been elsewhere. Hall v. Ind. Comm'n, 77 Colo. 338, 235 Pac. 1073 (1925);
Barnhart v. American Concrete Steel Co., 227 N. Y. 531, 125 N. E. 675 (1925).
Bagnel v. Springfield Sand & Tile Co., 144 F. 2d 65 (1st Cir. 1944), cert. denied
323 U. S. 735 (1944) seems to be the first case in which a court permitted recovery
for an injury in the forum (Massachusetts) though all other incidents of employ-
ment were elsewhere (New York). But it is now well established that the state
in which the injury occurred may give an award. Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U. S. 408
(1955); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 306 U. S. 493
(1939).
12 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 87.14 (1952).
r Grinnel v. Wilkinson, 39 R. I. 447, 98 Atl. 103 (1916) ; Gooding v. Ott, 77
W. Va. 487, 87 S. E. 862 (1916).
The United States Supreme Court has held that the state of the contract may
give an award. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 U. S. 532
(1935). Twelve states confer coverage regardless of where the injury occurred if
the contract was made in the state; Nevada requires also that the employee is in
regular employment in the state; California and Michigan require that the employee
also be in residence there. Other states permit recovery only if more than two
factors coincide; e.g., N. C.. GEN. STAT. § 97-36 (1950) : "If the contract of employ-
ment was made in this State, if the employer's place of business is in this State,
and if the residence of the employee is in this State; provided his contract of em-
ployment was not expressly for service exclusively outside of the State."
'In Mosely v. Empire Gas & Fuel Co., 313 Mo. 225, 281 S. W. 762 (1925),
the claimant could not proceed in the Missouri court under the Kansas Work-
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in both statutes have been such as to preclude the employee from invok-
ing the application of the statute of either state ;7 however, the prevail-
ing view was that he could apply for relief in both states, Today, certain
states permit their acts to be applied even if the contract is made and the
injury is sustained elsewhere because an employer-employee relationship
exists,9 or because the employer's business is localized in the state.10
The first constitutional limitation upon the freedom of the states in
determining the applicability of their own acts came in 1932 when Brad-
ford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper11 was decided. Suit had been brought
in New Hampshire under its workmen's compensation act by the admin-
istratrix of the deceased employee. His residence, as well as his em-
ployer's place of business were in Vermont '1, law made the remedy
provided by it exclusive' 2 of all other remedies and liabilities between the
employer and employee, regardless of where the injury or death occurred.
The employer availed himself of the Vermont act in defense to this suit.
The Supreme Court held that the creation of the employment relation
between the decedent and his company under the law of Vermont re-
quired New Hampshire's recognition of the obligation created under the
Vermont law and that it be given full faith and credit3 in the New
Hampshire courts. 14 Furthermore, the Court found the interest of New
men's Compensation Act. He was remitted to the agency which Kansas had set up
to administer its law. There is, however, no obstacle to enforcement if the com-
pensation laws of a state are court administered. Thus, the Louisiana compensation
act was enforced by the Mississippi court in Floyd v. Vicksburg Cooperage Co., 156
Miss. 567, 126 So. 395 (1930).
'House v. State Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 167 Ore. 257, 117 P. 2d 611 (1941).
'Ohio v. Chattanooga Boiler & Tank Co., 289 U. S. 439 (1933).
' Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U. S. 418 (1923). Regular employment
within the state is often sufficient to permit recovery. A few states (Delaware,
Pennsylvania, and Maryland) also require that the employer's business be within
the state. 2 LARSON, WORKCMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 87 (1952). The United
States Supreme Court held in Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 330 U. S. 469
(1947) that the District of Columbia had a substantial interest in the employer-
employee relationship and permitted a recovery in the District for an injury sus-
tained in Virginia.
"0 Stansberry v. Monitor Stove Co., 150 Minn. 1, 183 N. W. 977 (1929) ; State
ex. rel. Chambers v. District Court, 139 Minn. 205, 166 N. W. 185 (1918).
But no state statute permits recovery solely on the basis of residence. Horovitz,
Reviews of Leading Current Cases, 16 NACCA L. J. 38 (1955). An act limiting
recovery to residents was held unconstitutional in Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Indus-
trial Acc. Comm'n, 184 Cal. 26, 192 Pac. 1021 (1920), writ of error dismissed, 255
U. S. 445 (1921).
"286 U. S. 145 (1932) ; 11 N. C. L. Rwv. 116 (1933).
The operation of many workmen's compensation acts is exclusive of all other
remedies and liabilities between the employer and the employee with regard to the
injury sustained, unless the act or an agreement between the parties provide other-
wise. Jenkins v. American Enka Corp., 95 F. 2d 755 (4th Cir. 1938).
", The United States Constitution provides that "Full Faith and Credit shall be
given in each State to the public Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings of every
other State." U. S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1. A statute is a "public act" within the
meaning of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. R. Co. v.
George, 233 U. S. 354, 360 (1914).
, "It was clearly the purpose of the Vermont Act to preclude any recovery by
[Vol. 34
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Hampshire in this litigation to be only casual15 and her public policy not
affected by this decision.'
The following year, Ohio v. Chattanooga Boiler and Tank CoY.7
reached the Supreme Court. The employer and employee had accepted
the Tennessee workmen's compensation act which applied to injuries
elsewhere than in the state if the contract of employment was made in
Tennessee. An award had been made in Ohio under the Ohio statute,
and the State of Ohio sought to recover from the employer in Tennessee.
The employer claimed that the award should have been made under the
Tennessee act and that making an award under the Ohio act failed to
give full faith and credit to the Tennessee law. The Supreme Court
rejected this defense and held that the Clapper case did not require the
application of full faith and credit where the state statute did not provide
an exclusive remedy between employer and employee.
In Alaska Packers Association v. Industrial Accident Commission,'5
the Supreme Court modified the formal approach of the Clapper and
Ohio cases under the Full Faith and Credit Clause and permitted the
state which had the greater interest to apply her act. Here the contract
had been entered into in California and the parties had provided for the
exclusive application of the Alaska workmen's compensation act. The
employee was injured in Alaska and, on his return to California, brought
suit there under the California law. In defense, the employer contended
that the full faith and credit required to be given to the Alaska act barred
the application of California's statute. The Supreme Court held that
California could apply its act since it had a greater interest in this litiga-
tion than Alaska. The Court evidently anticipated that the injured em-
ployee, an indigent Mexican, would have become a public charge if the
suit had not been allowed.
This decision created a second exception to the application of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause: That an act which purports to provide an
exclusive remedy to an employee injured in the course of his employment
no longer controls if the state in which the suit is brought is substantially
concerned with the result of the proceedings.
proceedings brought in another state for injuries received in the course of a Ver-
mont employment." 286 U. S. 145, 153 (1932).
" In the light of subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court and the criticism
which has been made because recovery under the New Hampshire act had been
denied, it should be noted that the Supreme Court made this qualification: "We
have no occasion to consider whether if the injured employee had been a resident of
New Hampshire, or had been continuously employed there, or had left dependents
there, recovery might validly have been permitted under the New Hampshire law."
286 U. S. at 163.
8 "[The courts] do. not close their doors unless help would violate some funda-
mental principles of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-
rooted tradition of the common weal." Cardozo, J., in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co.,
224 N. Y. 99, 111, 120 N. E. 198, 202 (1918).
17 289 U. S. 439 (1933). 18294 U. S. 532 (1935).
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Similar reasons prevailed in Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v.
Industrial Accident Commission.19 The claimant had been hired in
Massachusetts whose workmen's compensation law provided the exclu-
sive remedy regardless of where the injury occurred. Here, too, suit was
brought in California, the locus injuriae, under the California statute.
Again the Supreme Court held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause
did not require the application of the foreign exclusive statute and per-
mitted California to apply "the remedy given by its own statute to its
residents by way of compensation for medical, hospital and nursing
services rendered to the injured employee."'20  It would have been ob-
noxious to California's public policy to require that the parties seek their
remedy in Massachusetts.
Finally, Carroll v. Lanza2 ' seems to leave little doubt that the forum
need not give full faith and credit to the act of a sister state in deter-
mining its right to apply its own. Carroll entered into a Missouri em-
ployment contract with Hogan, a sub-contractor, who had contracted
with Lanza for work to be performed in Arkansas. Carroll was injured
on the job and brought suit in Arkansas against Lanza for common-law
damages. The Supreme Court rejected Lanza's defense based on the
exclusive Missouri statute and held that Arkansas had a sufficient in-
terest to safeguard non-resident employees within the state.2 2  Since
the claimant had been removed to a Missouri hospital immediately after
the injury, the court seemed to hold that the occurrence of the injury
in Arkansas alone was sufficient grounds for the employee to seek a
remedy under Arkansas laws: "Arkansas therefore has a legitimate in-
terest in opening her courts to suits of this nature, even though in this
case Carroll's injury may have caused no burden on her or on her insti-
tutions." 23 Thus, with this decision the United States Supreme Court
seems to have come full circle since the Clapper case.2 4
" 306 U. S. 493 (1939).
201d. at 501. 21349 U. S. 408 (1955).
"Discussing the exclusive remedy provided by the Missouri statute, the Supreme
Court said: "Missouri can make her Compensation Act exclusive, if she chooses,
and enforce it as she pleases withinl her borders. Once that policy is extended into
other States, different considerations come into play. . . . We do not think the
Full Faith and Credit Clause demands that subserviency from the State of the
injury." (Emphasis added.) 349 U. S. at 413-414.
23 349 U. S. at 413.
Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Carroll v. Lanza, stated: "To make the
interest of Arkansas prevail over the interest of Missouri on the basis of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause would require that Clapper be explicitly overruled and that,
in the area of workmen's compensation law, the place of injury be decisive ...
It should not be cast aside on the presupposition that full faith and credit need not
be given to a sister-state workmen's compensation statute if the law of the forum
happens to be more favorable to the claimant." 349 U. S. at 421-422. However,
the late Professor Beale would have been pleased with this turn of events: "It is
greatly to be hoped for that the decision in the Clapper case will not stand; so
opposed is it to authority and to the well-established rule of jurisdiction." 2 BEALE,
CoN1 Icr OF LAWS 1326 (1935).
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While the employee is free to make his choice of law, once he has
made that choice he may be barred from asserting any further rights.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause is still a major consideration where
successive awards are being sought.
In 1943, the United States Supreme Court decided Magnolia Petro-
leum Co. v. Hunt.25 The petitioner had been employed in Louisiana
and had suffered an injury while on his job in Texas. He applied for
compensation there, not knowing at the time that Louisiana could give
him greater benefits. The Texas Accident Board made an award. He
then sought additional compensation in Louisiana. The Supreme Court
denied the second recovery. It based its decision on the Texas work-
men's compensation act which provided that once an award had been
made elsewhere, a second recovery could not be had in Texas.2 6 The
Court interpreted this to mean also that once an award was had in Texas
it was "final" 2 7 and required that it be given full faith and credit in all
other states.
This decision was opposed to many well-considered state court opin-
ions which had permitted a second recovery and had given full faith and
credit to a prior award by crediting the employer with an amount equal
thereto.28  Some courts had allowed full recovery in both states on the
theory that the employer had paid for insurance policies in each,29 even
if the total of the sums received by the employee was greater than the
total permissible under their own acts.3 0 Following the Magnolia Pe-
troleum Co. case many state courts continued to permit a second re-
covery.31
2r 320 U. S. 430 (1943), rehearing denied, 321 U. S. 801 (1943).
.0 The section of the Texas statute which was relied on by the majority provides
that an employee who is injured outside of the state cannot recover under the
Texas Act if "he has elected to pursue his remedy and recover in the state where
such injury occurred." Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 8306 § 19 (1936).
" "The Texas award had the force and effect of a judgment of a court of that
state and is res judicata there." 320 U. S. 430, 443 (1943).
-" McLaughlin's Case, 274 Mass. 217, 174 N. E. 338 (1931) ; Price v. Horton
Motor Lines, 201 S. C. 484, 23 S. E. 2d 744 (1942) ; Salvation Army v. Industrial
Comm'n, 219 Wis. 343, 263 N. W. 349 (1935) ; RESTATEMENT, CoNFLIct OF LAWS§ 403, prior to the 1947 amendment. But ef. DeGray v. Miller Bros. Const. Co.,
106 Vt. 259, 173 Atl. 556 (1934).
2 "Recovery of compensation in two states is no more illegal, and is not neces-
sarily more unjust than recovery upon two policies of accident or life insurance."
Rounsaville v. Central R. R. Co., 87 N. J. L. 371, 374, 94 Atl. 392, 393 (1915)
(dictum).
" Shelby Mfg. Co. v. Harris, - Ind. App. -, 44 N. E. 2d 315 (1942).
" Cline v. Byrne Doors, 324 Mich. 540, 37 N. W. 2d 630 (1949) granted com-
pensation in Michigan following a recovery of medical payments in Florida;
Loudenslager v. Gorum, 355 Mo. 181, 195, S. W. 2d 498 (1946) permitted an
award under the Missouri act after Arkansas had denied a recovery; see also Indus-
trial Indemnity Exchange v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 80 Cal. App. 2d 480, 182 P. 2d309 (1947) ; Cook v. Minneapolis Bridge Constr. Co., 231 Minn. 433, 43 N. W. 2d
792 (1950).
"Sufficient faith and credit are given to the first award when its entire amount
is deducted from the second award, and furthermore, the framers of the Constitu-
1956]
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In Industrial Commission of Wisconsin v. McCartin,3 2 Illinois, the
state of the contract, had made an award for an injury sustained by the
claimant in Wisconsin after a settlement between the employer and em-
ployee which provided that it did not affect any rights that the employee
wanted to exercise elsewhere. The employee then applied to Wisconsin
for a second award. The Wisconsin Supreme Court denied the applica-
tion,33 basing its decision on the Magnolia Petroleum Co. case. The
United States Supreme Court reversed, stating that the Illinois act, un-
like the Texas act in the Magnolia case, did not preclude an additional
award in another state: "If it were apparent that the Illinois award was
intended to be final and conclusive of all the employee's rights against
the employer ... the Magnolia Petroleum Co. case would be controlling
here." 34
Thus, the McCartin case seems to have limited the application of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause in actions for a second award to cases
where a prior award is "final" according to the express wording of the
first state's workmen's compensation statute.
The "finality" of an award was also considered by the Supreme Court
in Carroll v. Lanza.35 The injured employee bad received a number of
weekly payments under Missouri's workmen's compensation act, but no
formal award had been made. The payments were not final as they had
not been adjudicated. The Missouri act, unlike the Texas act in the
Magnolia case, did not deny a second recovery elsewhere. The Supreme
Court held that the employee was not precluded from maintaining a
second action in Arkansas, where he had been injured, and affirmed a
recovery there.
tion little dreamed that the full faith and credit clause would be applied to a theory
of work-injury liability unknown in their day." HOROVITZ, WORKMEN'S COMPEN-
SATION 42 (1948). But cf. Butler v. Lee Bros. Trucking Contractors, 206 Ark.
884, 178 S. W. 2d 58 (1944); Overcash v. Yellow Transit Co., 352 Mo. 993, 180
S. W. 2d 678 (1944).
22 330 U. S. 622 (1947).
" McCartin v. Ind. Comm'n, 248 Wis. 570, 22 N. W. 2d 522 (1946).
" Id. at 626. The import of the Texas statute and the Illinois act is similar:
"The employees . . . shall have no right of action against their employer . . . for
damages for personal injuries . . . but such employees . . . shall look for compen-
sation solely to the association. .. ." TEX. Rv. Civ. STAT. art. 8306 § 3 (1936).
The Illinois act provides that "no common law or statutory right to recover dam-
ages for injury or death sustained by an employee ... other than the compensation
herein provided, shall be available to any employee who is covered by the provisions
of this act." ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 48 § 143 (1931). Neither act expressly provides
that an award made in either Texas or Illinois is a bar to a second award elsewhere.
The writer submits that the Supreme Court properly could have relied on TEX.
REv. Civ. STAT. art. 8306 § 3 to reach a different result in the Magnolia Petroleum
Co. case.
Professor Larson believes that since the majority of workmen's compensation
laws resemble the Illinois act, the decisions in the McCartin case can be taken to
mean that successive awards are now sanctioned. 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPEN-
SATION LAW § 85.20 (1952).
32349 U. S. 408 (1955).
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In reaching this decision the Supreme Court used language which
suggests a different interpretation of the meaning of "finality" in the.
Magnolia Petroleum Co. case. The Court, discussing the finality of the'
Missouri award in the present (Lanza) case, stated that the award
which Texas had made in the Magnolia case had been final; but that the
award made here was not final because, under Missouri law, payment
had been voluntary and no adjudication between the employer and the
employee had been sought. This distinction seems to kefer to the Mag-
nolia Petroleum Co. decision as having been based on an award given
the finality of a judgment, instead of finality expressly contained in the
governing statute on which the Court had previously distinguished the
McCartin case. If the Supreme Court will abide by the Lanza interfpre-
tation of the Magnolia case, final (i.e. judgment) awards will have to
be given full faith and credit'in subsequent proceedings, and further re-
coveries will be barred.3 6
Recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court had the opportunity to
determine the "finality" of a New York award.37 The employee had
been injured in New Jersey and applied to New York, which granted
a final (judgment) award. He then sought a second recovery in New
Jersey. The New Jersey Court denied a second award; pointing to the
Magnolia Petrolem Co. case, it stated that the "clear purpose of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause . . . [is] that a litigation once pursued to
judgment shall be conclusive of the rights of the parties.... , (Em-
phasis added.) It seems that the New Jersey-Court recognized the
Magnolia case as standing for judgment-type finality in addition to statu-
tory finality which it had not found in the New York act.39
Apparently the New Jersey Court realized the harsh effect which
would be produced by its interpretation of the Magnolia case. Its deci-
sion went on to say that full faith and credit need not be given in those
cases where the prior award made in the other state "is so much less
" RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 403 (Supp. 1949) reads: "Award already
had under the Workmen's Compensation Act of another state will not bar a pro-
ceeding under an applicable Act, unless the Act where the award was made was
designed to preclude the recovery of an award under any other Act, but the amount
paid on a prior award in another state will be credited on the second award."(Emphasis added.) The italicized phrase was inserted after the Supreme Court
decided Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt and Industrial Commission of Wisconsin
v. iMfcCartin.. It interprets the Magnolia case as requiring statutory finality to bar
a second award. See also Donaldson, Conflict of Compensation Laws, 23 INsuR-
ANcE CoUNsEL JOURNAL 110 (1956). On the other hand, at least two courts seem
to have interpreted the Magiwlia Petroleum Co. case as standing for finality ofjudgment. Cline v. Byrne Doors, 324 Mich. 540, 37 N. W. 2d 630 (1949) ; Baduski
v. Gumpert Co., 277 App. Div. 591, 102 N. Y. S. 2d 297 (1951).
'
7 Buccheri v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 19 N. J. 594, 118 A. 2d 21 (1955).
"Id. at 604, 118 A. 2d at 27.
"The New Jersey Supreme Court referred to "statutory finality" as "exclusive-
ness"; it may thereby have left the impression that the New York workmen's
compensation act to which it had reference is "not exclusive." 19 N. J. at 604, 118
A. 2d at 27.
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than an award that could be allowed here that it can be reasonably said
that such an award is in conflict with the policy of our act... ."40 (Em-
phasis added.) While this limitation on full faith and credit may be
ineffective between states which provide similar awards, it may be of
value where great differences exist.4 '
Under the United States Supreme Court decisions the employee's
rights to a second award is now uncertain. If the Magnolia case and
the discussion of finality in the Lanza case may be relied on as requiring
judgment-type finality, the injured applicant will be barred from a second
award unless payments made by his employer were of a voluntary nature,
the state court permits the exception indicated by the New Jersey Court.
On the other hand, if Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt and Industrial
Commission of Wisconsin v. McCartin may be relied onas requiring full
faith and credit to be given a prior award only where it is final according
to the express wording of the statute, a second recovery may be had in
most cases.
42
The enactment of workmen's compensation statutes provided for
allocation of costs to the employer for the compelling social reason that
accidents are an inevitable hazard of industry. Their main objectives
are adequate benefits, elimination of wasteful litigation, and 'certainty
of payment.48  Prompt indemnity for wages lost4 4 as a result of injury
should be the employer's immediate concern. He should not permit an
"unholy race between uninformed workers and compensation wise car-
• 19 N. J. at 605, 118 A. 2d at 28.
,' The plaintiff had received $25.60 for time lost under the New York statute
which does not provide for compensation after the injured returns to work if his
earning power has not been diminished. N. Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW,
§ 15, s. 3v (1946). The State of New Jersey,. however, awards compensation
based upon the extent of the disability regardless of diminution of earning capacity.
N. J. REv. STAT. 34: 15-12c (1940). To how much more compensation would the
plaintiff have to prove himself entitled in the second state in this and similar situa-
tions to come within the exception announced by the New Jersey Supreme Court?
The New Jersey Supreme Court will have an opportunity to review his de-
cision. The instant case is pending on a petition for rehearing. Letter from Robert
Scherling, Newark, N. J., Attorney for the plaintiff, to the writer, May 1, 1956.
"' The writer believes that an exception would be encountered only if the injured
employee received his first award in Maryland. Gasch v. Britton, 202 F. 2d 356
(C. C. A. D. C. 1953).
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 97-36 (1950) provides that "if an employee shall receive
compensation or damages under the laws of any other state, nothing herein con-
tained shall be construed so as to permit a total compensation for the same injury
greater than is provided for in this article." Therefore, an injured employee who
received an award in State X and meets the jurisdictional requirements of the
North Carolina act may recover an additional amount in North Carolina, but not
more than the difference between the maximum amount provided by its statutes and
the amount he received in the former state.
SO-ERS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 27 (1954).
"Cash benefits replace little more than one third of the wage-loss in the average
case. Bogusch, Reports and Motes from Everywhere, 16 NACCA L. J. 460 (1955).
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riers to see who creates an award first"44 if the employee is eligible for
compensation in more than one state. Rather, employers and courts
should provide protection45 within the framework of the laws when deal-
ing with redress for industrial injuries. Any other attitude would not
be consonant with the spirit in which the compensation statutes were
enacted.46
PETER H. GERNS.
Constitutional Law-Contempt-Court's Jurisdiction over the Re-
ligious Upbringing of Children
The recent Iowa case of Lynch v. Uhlenhopp1 presents a situation
which probably has never arisen before. A divorce decree had been
entered in a previous suit under which the wife had obtained custody of
the six-year-old child of the marriage. The parents had agreed by stipu-
lation, written and signed, that the "child shall be reared in the Roman
Catholic religion," and the court's decree embodied the exact terms of
this stipulation. Several months after the decree was entered, the peti-
tioner (wife) began taking the child to Protestant Sunday school and
since that time has been rearing the child in the Protestant faith. It
seems that the father protested to the mother about this matter shortly
after he learned about it, and brought the present proceedings to enforce
the terms of the custody decree. In this proceeding the father did not
seek and the district court did not order a transfer of the child's custody
to him. The district court held that the decree was binding upon the
mother so long as it remained unvacated and unmodified, adjudged her in
contempt, but suspended passing sentence upon her in order to afford her
an opportunity to purge herself by filing an affidavit to the effect "that
she is rearing the child in the Catholic faith." Writ of certiorari was
granted and execution of the order has been stayed pending completion
of the hearing to review the order.
The main question presented on appeal will be whether the court
"In some cases the insurance carrier can create an award in the state whose
laws are more favorable to the employer before the employee takes steps to protect
himself. HoRovivz, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 41 (1948); therefore, the result
of the Magnolia Petroleum Co. case may tempt an employer to shop for the state
with the smallest award. Cheatham, Res Judicata and the Full Faith and Credit
Clause-Magnolia Petroleum Co. z. Hunt, 44 COLUM. L. R. 330, 345 (1944) ...
"5 An award of compensation by the Arkansas commission to a Texas employee
for injuries sustained in Arkansas, on petition filed by the employer wfithout the
knowledge of the employee, did not bar a second award under the Texas act.
Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Skidmore, - Tex. Civ. App. -, 222 S. W. 2d 344 (1949).
" "Under our statute the workman is the soldier of organized industry, accept-
ing a kind of pension in exchange for absolute insurance on his master's premises."
Bausman, J., in Stertz v. Ind. Ins. Comm'n, 91 Wash. 588, 606, 158 Pac. 256, 363
(1916).
'- Iowa -, - N. W. 2d - (1956). Now on appeal from the District Court
of Wright County, Iowa.
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